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1 Bitcoin and Distributed Ledger Technology
Consider Blockchain.
In 1991 it was just a research idea [4], which was commercialised as a digital
timestamping service called Surety in 1995.3 In 2008 a design for a cryptocur-
rency called Bitcoin was introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto (an alias); it went live
in January 2009.
On 10 October 2010 Bitcoin traded at 10 cents / bitcoin. By 29 February
2011 it was at 1 USD / Bitcoin. By 1 April 2013 it reached 100 USD / Bitcoin.
Bitcoin scraped 1000 USD / Bitcoin at the end of 2013, fell back, but then
rallied and reached 19,783 USD / Bitcoin on 17 December 2017. Unsurprisingly
there came a crash — but Bitcoin was not wiped out and its reputation was not
utterly destroyed: it survived and at time of writing, Bitcoin trades at around
10,000 USD / bitcoin (for a trading volume of roughly ten million transactions
per month). That is a 100,000-fold increase in value in ten years.
It’s not just as a store of value that Blockchain technology has shown re-
silience; it has shown real influence. Innumerable elaborations on the underlying
ideas have been spun off. Some are foolish; some are fraudulent; some are sen-
sible. However, it is clear that at the time of writing the world is awash with a
soup of cryptocurrency-related businesses, startups, research projects, and ini-
tiatives. And more generally — since a cryptocurrency is just a special instance
of a distributed ledger — the cryptocurrency soup is just one well-known eddy
in a cauldron of blockchain-based distributed ledger ideas.
Our question is: why?
This is not to ask just why blockchain has seen growth and resilience —
though this is part of the question. Our question is: why has blockchain-based
tech in particular seen this interest?
There is no shortage of plausible future tech: biotech, fintech (financial tech-
nology), quantum tech, 3-D printing tech, battery tech, space tech, renewable
energy tech, machine learning tech . . . and so forth. It is unclear that blockchain
technology will be more important for human progress, or offer a clearly better
ROI, than (say) biotech, fintech, or machine learning. Indeed these are all expe-
riencing their own booms — and deservedly so, because they have a pedigree of
delivering concrete benefits and profits.
What does blockchain have, that (for instance) machine learning does not?
3 It’s still running.
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A word on terminology: We may use the terms blockchain and distributed ledger
technology (DLT) interchangeably, but in fact they mean slightly different things:
– a blockchain is a (usually distributed, usually cryptographically assured)
chain of blocks (the technical term is Merkle tree), whereas
– a distributed ledger is a database that exists on (i.e. is distributed over)
multiple locations (but not necessarily secured on an actual blockchain).
So technically, the git version management system is a blockchain, and a RAID
1 hard drive array is a distributed ledger. In practice, the terms blockchain and
DLT are used to refer to a cryptographically secured block-structured distributed
ledger, usually with some element of peer-to-peer communication and consensus.
If we write ‘blockchain’ or ‘DLT’, we mean one of them — along with a general
hint that DLT is intended in a slightly more general sense than blockchain. A
cryptocurrency is then a currency whose ownership ledger is distributed on a
cryptographically secured blockchain.
2 A carnival of incompetence
Blockchain has a history of error, fraud, and incompetence so outrageous4 that
even for the cynical reader it is worth recalling a very short selection of examples:
– 2011 Bitomat kept its wallet on an ephemeral Amazon EC2 server. Being
‘ephemeral’ meant that when the server restarted, it would restart with
empty discs. They restarted the server. 17,000 BTC got wiped.
– 2012 Bitcoinia was a 16-year old’s first serious PHP project. It quickly got
hacked, and because the admin had reused their password on other secure
sites, this led to a wave of further hacks. 18,547 BTC lost.
– 2011-2014 850,000 BTC were siphoned out of the Mt Gox exchange.
– 2015 AllCrypt was run on a MySQL server that also ran WordPress. This
is the security equivalent of building a bomb shelter with patio doors. It did
not end well.
– 2016 Loanbase did the same thing.
– 2017 Zerocoin had a basic error in its code; == (is equal to) instead of =
(make equal to). Coins could be spent twice, and were.
– 2019 QuadrigaCX founder Gerald Cotten died (or possibly absconded),
leaving his laptop with 190 million USD in crypto assets locked under a
password that only he knew.
3 Q. What is DLT good for? A. Not much, and yet. . .
The list above, tragicomic as it is, cautions against dismissing the interest in
blockchain tech as a mere mania. Yes it is a mania, and full of fools, but if this
were only about manic foolishness then presumably — after ten years’ nonsense
4 Thanks to [3, page 36] for collecting many of these examples.
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like the above — the field would fall into disrepute and the fools would move on
to the next thing.
Instead, interest in DLT has only increased. After each disaster the investors
piled back in, with renewed determination. Blockchain projects have multiplied
and the headline value of Bitcoin has failed to go down the drain.
Yet we struggle to find use cases for DLT on a scale to justify such optimism.
This is not to say that potential use cases are inconceivable or elusive: on the
contrary, plausible potential use cases abound. What is difficult, even today, is
to find proven use cases.
In fact there are only two cardinal successes so far, and both are cryptocur-
rencies: Bitcoin, and Ethereum.5 In terms of demonstrated usefulness and func-
tionality, Bitcoin and Ethereum are of interest only as stores of value.6
This is a circular and self-referential answer to the question of why DLT has
value: Bitcoin and Ether have value because everyone agrees they have value.
While perhaps satisfactory for an investor, it does not address the fundamental
academic question of why.
At this point we should perhaps mention that we make no claim that DLT
cannot create value, have applications, and demonstrate fundamental ROI be-
yond Bitcoin and Ethereum as a store of value.
But the intensity and persistence of the mania surrounding this technology,
are striking: a technology with no use cases aside from itself, and with a ten-
year history of abject failure, corruption, and people getting fleeced, refuses to
die and instead stimulates continued interest and investment. Investors have not
(all) moved on to the next fad. Researchers (including the authors) remain active
in the sector. Businesses display patience and continued interest.
Why?
4 The economic ideas of Karl Marx
To try and arrive at a fresh understanding of what is happening, we will consider
some economic and political theory, and a little history.
Karl Marx was an economist, political theorist, and socialist revolutionary.7
The first two aspects of his work interest us most here.
5 Apologies to the cryptocurrencies we left out. At time of writing, Ether’s market
capitalisation is a tenth that of Bitcoin and it is the largest of the so-called altcoins
(crypto other than Bitcoin; Ripple is next, with a twentieth). We mention Ethereum
in particular because of its widespread cultural influence, due to its adoption and
its emphasis on smart contracts, which has sparked many projects and elaborations
. . .
6 . . . but smart contracts, while interesting (especially to a logician/programmer, such
as the second author) are not yet a proven functionality. They deserve their own
essay which we leave for future work.
7 US lay readers please note: in Europe, ‘socialist’ is not an insult and may even be a
compliment.
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In Marx’s seminal essay Wage Labour and Capital (Lohnarbeit und Kapital)
of 1849 [2], Marx defined a factor of production as a unit in an economy [12]. He
identified Labour and Capital as two major factors of production:
– Labour is work: digging ditches, childcare, writing articles, teaching, consul-
tancy, and so forth.
– Capital is assets: buildings, tools, factories, dollars, bitcoin, rights (such as
copyright or land rights), and so forth.
Marx observed that Labour and Capital are fundamentally in opposition:
– Labour wants labour to be expensive and assets to be cheap.
– Capital wants labour to be cheap and assets to be expensive.
This is a simple but not trivial observation: that there is a chain to creating
value, and each party in the value chain has an incentive to maximise their
benefit.
For society to function, these imperatives must find an equilibrium:
– Labour — meaning people who work — must be paid enough to invest in
themselves and their families.
If this were not to happen then society would implode, because nobody
would have money to buy capital items, pay for services, and nurture the
next generation of educated and productive citizens.
– Capital — meaning people who own stuff — must be paid enough that
owning and maintaining stuff is worthwhile.
If this were not to happen then society would implode, because nobody would
have an incentive to take care of things, nor invest in the future to maintain
and develop the tools, tangible and intangible, which humans need.
Marx’s basic argument was that this equilibrium is unstable and unsustainable:
– Competition would lead to increases in worker efficiency.
– For an individual worker, greater efficiency is generally good — an internet
connection, for instance, helps these authors to efficiently research and teach.
This is a good thing, which e.g. the authors’ students value, and the authors’
university employers can monetise.
– However, for the system as a functioning whole the effects need not neces-
sarily be so positive: if we can obtain the same productive output from fewer
workers, then the value of work overall may drop, unless more work can be
invented.
In Marx’s day, ‘work’ meant digging ditches (to put it crudely).8 But, the world
only needs so many ditches. Therefore, if e.g. thanks to a mechanical digger
the same number of ditches can be dug by 10% of the workforce, and suppose
also that with new teaching technology universities can teach the same number
8 It would be unfair to fault Marx for failing to anticipate the digital economy. More
on this in Section 8.
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of students with 10% of the professors — then 90% of this workforce becomes
redundant. This is not just in terms of a particular individual no longer having a
specific employment, but in terms of the systemic economic relevance of including
working people in the system.
They are not needed; and things that are not economically needed, have
no economic value. Even if we put on our callous capitalist hats and set aside
the inhumanity and social damage of the unemployment experience, this also
destroys the value of capital itself: because, if the people are not needed, then
neither are the capital assets to maintain them as humans.
Thus if the value of labour collapses, then so does the value of capital, and
Marx’s analysis of the system as a whole, viewed as an economic machine inhab-
ited by humans,9 is that it will increase in efficiency, shed labour, shed capital,
implode, and collapse.
In short: Marx’s observation was that the capitalist system, in and of itself
and even taken purely in terms of its own internal logic, is unstable and inherently
self-contradictory.
The historical record is unclear whether he was right. Capitalism has not
collapsed yet, but that does not mean it won’t. We certainly have no grounds to
be smug.10
We will argue that in a sense, the remarkable recent persistence of interest
in DLT reflects an awareness of, and is a response to, the problems described
above; but we are not yet ready to describe how. First, we must survey some
recent economic history.
5 Labour vs. Capital: a tug of war
A simple test to see where the balance of power lies between Labour and Capital
is to look at inflation:
– If inflation is high, Labour is powerful and can command ever greater wages.
– If inflation is low, Capital is powerful and can hold wages down.
From a perspective of Marxian economics, inflation is quite a reliable indicator
of the balance of power between Labour and Capital. If this balance of power
shifts too far in one direction or another, central banks can try to manipulate the
resulting inflation, or lack of it, by controlling the money supply. However, since
the financial crisis of 2008, attempts to create inflation have been ineffective —
which suggests that the traditional (monetarist) view of inflation may not be so
applicable to a world with globalised finance and supply chains.11
9 . . . but not serving them; we have our callous capitalist hats on here, for the sake of
this argument . . .
10 At this point this article could suggest that a more socially conscious and humane
economic system might also be a more stable and sustainable one. This suggestion
is reasonable and worth exploring (and has been explored by other authors [5]) —
but not in this essay. We need to follow a different thread.
11 So that’s two things a capitalist’s money can’t buy: love, and inflation.
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With this test in mind, we will sketch the context of the current interest in
blockchain tech, by looking at the broad sweep of inflation over the past eighty
years since the end of the Second World War.12 We will split this into three eras:
– Era 1, 1945–1979: from the end of the Second World War to the elections of
Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and Ronald Regan (1981-1989).
– Era 2, 1979–2008: from the Thatcher/Regan era and the corollary adminis-
trations which followed, through to the 2008 financial crisis.
– Era 3, 2008–today: the reality our teenage University students enter as work-
ing adults.
In 1945 both Labour and Capital were significantly depleted after the disasters
of the first half of the 20th century. Social solidarity in their wake was high, and
it was agreed that both Labour and Capital required investment.
Capital was scarce, but Labour was in even greater demand because:
– labour is required to produce capital, but capital is not required to produce
labour,13 and
– with depleted capital, labour was relatively unproductive and therefore more
of it was required.
The 1950s and 1960s were good times to be at work, and because there was plenty
of demand for labour to go around, workers could build capital and increase
efficiency and see this reflected in rising paycheques.
And, it is not just about wages: society valued Labour and was willing to
speculatively invest in skills and education. For instance, the Servicemen’s Read-
justment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill) was described as a reward for war service —
which it was — but its deeper meaning was an investment in labour skills and ed-
ucation (for example, free university education). Another influential example of
post-war investment in Labour has been the UK’s Open University (1969), which
has inspired open universities in many other countries, e.g. in Israel (1974) [10].
Jumping ahead just for this paragraph from the US in 1944 to the UK in
1998 (in the middle of our Era 2 above): university education, which until then
had been free, became not-free as tuition fees were introduced.14 These were
modest at first but the precendent had been set and fees rose to a maximum of
9,000 pounds a year in 2010 (this was after the financial crisis, at the start of
our Era 3).
In our analysis this social signal should alert us that something important
has happened, because tuition fees are — in fact — not tuition fees at all, but
instead they are a targeted tax on Labour; workers are welcome to join the
workforce and add productively to the economy, and all society asks of them
in return is to pay a modest upfront tax of 36,000 pounds (assuming a four
12 This analysis is US/UK-centric, which is a simplification but a reasonable one, be-
cause the dollar is the world’s currency and because thus far the main drivers of
blockchain technology have also been US/UK-centric.
13 Raising children is necessarily labour-intensive, but not necessarily capital-intensive.
14 . . . by a UK Labour government, we might add.
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year course) against future earnings. What could be regressive about that? The
contrast with the Era 1 attitude, could hardly be more stark.15
In the 1970s something changed: wages stopped rising. This was a decade of
strikes; Marx would say that productivity gains had finally started to eat into
the value of Labour. Fewer workers were required, but they continued demanding
the wage increases of previous decades, but now, just as Marx predicted, Labour
lacked its old leverage. Social unrest followed.
Something had to give, and between 1979 and 1981 the balance of power
swung to Capital — which was terrified of inflation, this being one thing that
can really eat into the value of a capital asset.
An ideology was required to justify the falling value of work and workers,
and this was promoted as individualism. Exaggerated symbols of independence
developed, such as Madonna’s Material Girl and Aronold Schwartzenegger’s
body. These myths were of people who didn’t need anybody’s help and were
strong and rich and successful because of it; and they were held up as icons
of a new capitalism. But the actual effect was to break the power of Labour,
since if everybody is in it for themselves, then they are not in it for one another
and they can therefore collectively be exploited more, paid less, and/or fired —
and, as per the ideology, it’s their own fault for not working hard enough, not
being entrepreneurial enough, and not wanting it enough.16 The Thatcher-era
right-to-buy of council properties [6] was part of this too: making it possible for
workers to take ownership of their homes turned them into holders of capital,
and thus gave them a stake in the new system.
15 This is in England. Scotland has no tuition fees.
16 To be clear, Thatcher and Regan were trying to solve real problems. Labour was
worth less; the strikes could not continue; and something did need to be done.
However, the human cost of the adjustments was lasting and non-negligible, and
this cost fell mostly on Labour instead of Capital. The way the ideology blamed its
victims for their victimhood, was as elegant as it was cruel, and the repercussions
and costs of this injury and insult resonate to this day — and not only for Labour:
once asset ownership was more important for income than the labour contributed,
this devalued the caring professions like childminders, doctors, and nurses. Now
the coronavirus pandemic (which flared up during the preparation of this article)
has thrown a particularly graphic light on how professions that are economically
irrelevant as measured by GDP, can become a matter of life and death, and how
even if we only care about GDP, failing to account for the value network in which
that one economic measure is embedded can become self-defeating.
In retrospect one could certainly try to devise exits from the 1970s situation which
in the long term might have been more equitable and economically beneficial.
This concern is relevant today because we are now seeing elements of the strategy
replayed; e.g. with the so-called gig economy, and individualistic slogans such as be
the CEO of you. These are not necessarily all bad — a gig may be a welcome earner
for e.g. an individual with some energy and free time — but we have seen in our
lifetime what the systemic consequences can be of promoting as a cool lifestyle choice
a business model that is great for Capital and terrible for Labour, and can therefore
not claim ignorance this time around.
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Over the following thirty years to 2008, the value of capital shot up. In
retrospect we see that this postponed the problem but it did not solve it, and
the financial crash of 2008 was of a piece with the strikes of the 1970s:
– In the 1970s the return on investment in Labour either flattened out or
became self-defeating. In a rush to maintain returns the system became
unstable. With Labour weakened and discredited, political power shifted to
Capital.
– In the 2000s a similar process took place with Capital; the return on in-
vestment in capital flattened out or became self-defeating, and in a rush to
maintain returns, the system became unstable — the precise mechanism was
that Capital borrowed money and leveraged it, but the deeper driver here
was that Capital had run out of ways to earn real returns, and so it invented
imaginary ones.
We now see the problem: where can the pendulum swing next?
6 Nostalgia vs. the future
When society is in difficulty, people can either be realistic and analytic about
their difficulties . . . or they can look to vivid fantasies of escape. These fantasies
are quite revealing:
– Go back to the 50s and 60s! White men were real Men, the world was ruled
by Christians, and women and children and black people knew their place.
Much of current US politics has retreated to this space.
– Go back to the 70s! Workers united to face down evil capitalists. Yes, it
didn’t come out so well for the workers then, but this time will be different.
This current has not met with electoral success in either the US or the
UK, though it may remain relevant as a pigeonhole into which to stereotype
proponents of a more socially conscious capitalism.
– Go back to the 80s! This is like going back to the 50s and 60s, but with more
tech and funkier suits.
Baby-boomers are particularly prone to this fantasy, because the 80s were
good to them, especially if they bought property.
– Anarchy and authoritarianism are all jumbled up in a single item of political
opportunism.
This would be amusing, were it not for the election of so many outrageously
unfit politicians in 2016-2018, along with an enabling retinue of crooks, fa-
natics, and thieves, all anxious to carve up what is left of the pie before (they
fear) the music will finally stop.
– Zoom to the future, usually with new tech — like in Star Trek! But perhaps
without the aliens, or the warp drive, but the point is: tech will solve our
problems.17
17 Marx would have countered that tech is the problem. We return to this in Section 8.1.
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The dreams of blockchain lie here. Viewed in context as an escapist fantasy,
they are not clearly more dangerous than the alternatives — and at least as
a fantasy it is forward- rather than backward-looking, which matters.
It is now important to appreciate that blockchain is not just any old techno-
utopian escapist fantasy. It is also a concrete technology, with specific technical
qualities, which make certain promises, not all of which are unreasonable.
Consider what Labour and Capital most fear:
– Labour worries that resources will continue to be co-opted by Capital. This
is valid since it has been a pattern for the past forty years — that is, wealth
inequality has trended up [8,9]. Most recently the US leaned shamelessly
into this with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, in which wealthy
Americans essentially agreed to cut taxes on the wealthy and thus allocate
more of the pie to themselves.
– Capital worries that Labour, fed up with stagnant wages and aggravated by
regressive taxation and lagging and biased social investment, may decide the
game is hopelessly rigged and rise up and confiscate assets — either through
progressive taxes and political reform; or through theft and destruction. Or,
perhaps a corrupt government will take advantage of social instability and
loss of legitimacy to concentrate wealth in a new elite, as has happened in
history before. These fears too are reasonable.
– Both Labour and Capital, again with good reason, fear a currency collapse
whose real costs they may be unable to avoid, or inflict upon somebody else.
Here, Bitcoin makes some relevant promises: in particular, it promises anonymity
and independence from government. Thus:
– Labour projects onto this an ideal of a libertarian currency that is accessible
to all, cannot be coopted, and (implicitly) promises financial independence
from a corrupted and discredited elite.
– Capital projects onto this an ideal of a stable and secure asset that cannot
be inflated away or confiscated by a vengeful mob come to grab their share.
– Both Labour and Capital like the idea that Bitcoin cannot be inflated away.
One Bitcoin will still be one Bitcoin tomorrow . . . whereas a dollar may be
worth only fifty cents.
7 Blockchain’s promise
In fact, Bitcoin is not anonymous [1],18 patterns of Bitcoin ownership resemble
those of other capital assets [7], and Bitcoin is volatile, liable to theft, and difficult
to transact in.
However fiat currencies share many of the same features: they can also be
not anonymous, unevenly distributed, volatile, and liable to theft. Libertarians
18 It is pseudonymous, which sounds like ‘anonymous’ but means something quite dif-
ferent.
10 Devraj Basu, Murdoch J. Gabbay
particularly emphasise here institutional theft by inflation — it is unclear how
rampant theft of cryptocurrencies by hackers is any better, but at least it’s not
by a government. As Satoshi wrote:
The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust thats required
to make it work. The central bank must be trusted not to debase the
currency, but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of that
trust.
So in relative terms Bitcoin may not seem that bad, and in any case the utopian
promise is there, even if the reality has not caught up just yet.
And here is why cryptocurrencies have captured the collective imagination.
It is not just that we live in uncertain times. There seems a sense in which
we may be at the end of an economic arc, which started in 1945, inflected in
1979, and has reached some endpoint since 2008, where increases in productivity
of Labour and Capital have stalled or become counter-productive at the same
time.
There seems nowhere to turn, the system is wobbling, and the key component
of trust in that system, is ebbing away.
If so, then this is an arc which Marx predicted. The endpoint of his prediction
was a social collapse which may yet happen, and (so the fear) we may be trapped
on this trajectory by an economic logic which we struggle to escape.
Fantasies of escape to a golden age are obvious nonsense, and even their pro-
ponents, wilfully blind as they may be, are aware of this at some level, which
accounts for the stridency of much of current politics. Next to this, cryptocur-
rencies promise a way out which is not obviously any more crazy than anything
else, and this is why Bitcoin has bounced back from one disaster after another,
and why research and investment continue to flow to blockchain tech, trying to
make it work.
Yes, many of the other techs from Section 1 have proven capable of generating
ROI within the current system — but as Marx argued, beyond a certain point
just increasing the productivity of individual components in an economy does
not necessarily make the economic system as a whole stable or more productive,
so just delivering ROI does not in itself address the deeper worry.
What no tech can currently promise is an escape from this contradiction,
which Marx observed embedded in the system itself — no tech, that is, except
for blockchain. That promise, however tenuous, is specific to our time.
The problem is, blockchain technology does not actually deliver. It is, for
now, vapourware.
So in summary so far: we have argued that blockchain promises, but does not
yet deliver, a modern technological fix to a specific social and economic problem
which was predicted by Karl Marx back in 1849 and which, arguably, the world
economy has been stuck in for the decade since 2008.
We will argue next that since Marx’s time there have been two developments
which he could not have forseen and which may have modified the rules of the
game:
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– The rise of the digital economy, and specifically of intangible assets that can
be infinitely copied at near-zero cost, and which must therefore be protected
by copyright.
– The rise of Data as a new factor of production.
We will discuss the technology first.
8 Blockchain as a technology in the digital economy
8.1 The tech
For Marx, technology was as much a problem as a solution. As discussed, it
increases worker efficiency to the point that having workers becomes systemically
unnecessary, so that capital becomes unnecessary, so that the economic system
implodes.
On the face of it the digital economy makes this worse than Marx could
have imagined. Moving electrons around is extremely low cost; it is no harder to
make a million copies of a program than one. A small number of good program-
mers can move many electrons, and one reason for the concentrations of wealth
which we have seen19 is surely just down to social policy failing to distribute the
exceptional productivity of computer programs.
A concrete example gives a feel for the numbers that can be at play: in 2017
Facebook bought WhatsApp for 19 billion USD. At the time, WhatsApp had
55 employees. Some of this money was set against projected future earnings,
but the fact remains that on a per-capita basis, the market judged that each
WhatsApp employee had created 350 million USD in current or future value.
For this reason Capital loves the digital economy. Once you have copyright
control of a program or film, or a patent, you have an economic perpetual motion
machine and need do little more than sit back and rake in the profits.20 Labour
is effectively removed from the equation — aside from perhaps having to feed
and clothe the families of no more than 55 programmers.
Labour also loves the digital economy. It brings comfort and increased pro-
ductivity — provided you have the necessary skills, of course. If not, you may
have a problem.21
‘Technology’ however is a broad term, and blockchain tech has some quite
unusual features which may not be generally appreciated.
Let us look at the core technology that had to be harnessed in order to
start off the revenue streams of some companies that are now worth hundreds
of billions of USD:
19 Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, and Alphabet were worth roughly 1 trillion USD each in
January 2020, and Alibaba, Facebook, and Tencent about half a trillion USD [11].
That really is a lot of money.
20 Copyright trolls practice the purest form of this business model, which impressively
combines being a malevolent and parasitic modern piracy, with being an elegant
distillation of an essential truth of the digital economy.
21 . . . and so may society. We still need waiters, nurses, teachers, and childminders. The
problem is figuring how to pay them, which was part of Marx’s critique.
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– Facebook is fundamentally based on a labelled graph. Graph here is in the
mathematical sense of a connected object with nodes (dots) joined by edges
(lines); a Facebook landing page, with icons of people on a map of the world
and connected by lines, sums it up.
The mathematical notion of graph is a first-year undergraduate topic: it is
not hard.
– The Google pagerank algorithm is, fundamentally, an advanced undergrad-
uate project or perhaps early-stage PhD.
– Amazon is ‘just’ a database, and MS-Dos, Windows, and MS Word are fairly
simple programs.
This is not to say that Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft are based
on simple systems; on the contrary, scaling up from the initial product to the
worldwide firms we know today is technically very complex.
Nor is this to say that creating such companies was simple and easy. Far from
it; there were more failures than successes.
Our point is that, if we assume the course is set, the winning formula found,
and that whatever wisdom or luck that was required has been added to the mix
— in other words, if we assume we have won this particular lottery — then the
fundamental conceptual requirements of getting the tech started, were not great.
Contrast this with for example ARM, Intel, and Airbus. The tech required to
fabricate chips or aircraft is rocket-scientist level from the start; it requires spe-
cialists with years of training, and specialist managers able to manage them and
if things go wrong then people get very excited and have government inquiries.22
To put it another way: you can’t start a chip fabrication business in your
garage, but you can start a trillion dollar software company — or at least, you
could ten or fifteen years ago (nowadays the incumbents would buy you up or
crowd you out, but that is a different debate).
Blockchain in its infancy is more like Airbus than Amazon. To start a rev-
enue stream based on DLT requires expertise, research, and special management
which simply has not yet been assembled in the sector. Consider that a com-
pany wishing to generate a revenue stream from a cryptocurrency product must
commit to solving mathematical problems that are:
– fundamentally hard,
– in a safety-critical context,
– for consumer use.
It is ambitious, and may be impossible, to satisfy all three of these criteria
simultaneously in an initial product.
Part of the difficulty is that this requires specialised programmers and math-
ematicians to invent and implement a new body of mathematics, but also, it
requires processes and qualified managers who do not exist yet because the field
22 Yes, the Wright brothers worked out of a bicycle shop, but that was over a hundred
years ago and they were aiming for a prototype plane, not a socially transformative
global cryptocurrency. The two things are different.
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has not matured; potential regulatory changes to provide a legal framework into
which users can escape if and when things go wrong (because they always do);
and a programme of public education to educate a population who (as a general
body) may still be storing their PaS5w0rds on post-it notes stuck to the monitor.
8.2 A prediction
Based on the analysis above, we would like to offer a prediction, just for the sake
of argument.
The killer apps and real impact of blockchain will not appear first as front-end
consumer applications.23 They will appear in backend applications, developed
by large institutions (banks, or logistics companies, or large tech companies) for
internal use or for use with their institutional peers.
These will be organisations with deep pockets and long experience of manag-
ing extreme complexity, who can afford to engage (and if necessary to create) a
small army of highly-specialised programmers, lawyers, computer scientists, and
mathematicians to develop a product that requires a PhD just to switch it on
safely.
In other words: in spite of the success of Bitcoin we predict that blockchain
tech will behave economically more like rocket science, and less like cash, and
will democratise only later, if at all.
8.3 A few words on data
On the face of it, Data is just an asset. By this view, owning data is like owning
any other capital asset.
However, Data has the potential to become a factor of production in its own
right; an actor on a level with or even ruling over Labour and Capital.
What is the difference? In practice, we propose that the difference between
an asset class and a factor of production is that the former only demands mainte-
nance, whereas the latter tends to actively pull itself together into a self-serving
entity:
– Labour is people. People flow together because humans are social.
– Capital is ownership of things. Things demand care to remain operational,
increase in value, and not be stolen. This gives holders of capital as a group
an incentive to flow together to cooperate and protect their wealth.
– Data in its modern forms, looks like an asset for input e.g. to machine learn-
ing and AI algorithms, but it is not just that: Data requires curation to
harvest and clean it, infrastructure to process it, and it displays potent net-
working effects; a database that is twice as large is (crudely put) four times
as useful. These properties give data a form; it tends to want to flow together
into a single entity, just like Labour and Capital do.
23 This is not to say that consumer applications will not exist; just that they will be
made for the sake of it and not actually be that important, except perhaps for public
education and diffusion of the ideas.
14 Devraj Basu, Murdoch J. Gabbay
It will be a social and regulatory question whether Data becomes a capital asset,
or a factor of production on a par with Labour and Capital, and if the latter,
whether it will be an equal, a subordinate, or the master of Labour and Capital.
This is relevant to our Marxian analysis because it is one pertinent way in
which the world which Marx was thinking in, differs substantively from the world
which we now inhabit. There may be a new actor in the drama, and how they
could influence the story is not yet understood. We leave a fuller analysis to
future work.
9 The way ahead
If Marx were around today, we suspect he would have liked crypto, at least in
principle. The promise of Bitcoin to allow Labour to mine coin and thus take
control of the means of production of what one might call cryptocapital, is a
relevant24 and clearly Marxian dream — though sadly it is only a dream.25
By looking at the world as Marx did in 1849, we have obtained an analysis of
why blockchain tech has been so uniquely resilient in 2008-2020, and what it re-
ally promises for the future: namely, an escape from Marx’s logical contradiction
as outlined in Section 4.
We can now turn to a natural corollary question: could Blockchain actually
save us from the trap that Marx identified? Perhaps.
In Blockchain’s favour, it does not generally destroy jobs, and it renews
incentives to invest in Labour, because designing, implementing, and managing
these systems is skilled work, in highly specific ways.
Making blockchain-related technologies work implies significant investment
in logic and formal methods;26 tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of highly-
qualified programming and management jobs; the democratisation of high-level,
high-assurance programming languages and the skills to use them; much work
in communication and education; entire new areas of mathematical research,
regulation, and legal specialisation; and arguably, the rise of a new breed of
hyper-technical companies employing programmers with skills that are currently
expected only of the highest-level graduates. In other words, Blockchain means
employment, innovation, and investment in skills, and this will increase the value
of Labour.
24 The actions of the US Federal Reserve in the coronavirus pandemic have reminded
us how the means of production of capital in the US (and thus in the world) are
operated to serve an oligarchic elite. It would not be prudent to stake one’s life and
livelihood on an expectation that Capital will share the pie, because it won’t.
25 Mining Bitcoin has long ceased to be democratic; most is now mined in huge cen-
tralised ‘Bitcoin farms’, or by distributed malware.
For the record: Bitcoin is a proof-of-work system (proof-of-stake is inherently
different). The industry is aware of this issue and attempts are being made to design
cryptocurrencies that do not reward centralisation so much. (If the reader has tried
to buy a graphics card in the past five years, that price spike you may have noticed
was due to crypto mining — and now graphics cards are used for AI. But we digress.)
26 This is the second author’s professional specialisation.
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Importantly, Blockchain is at the same time creating capital, albeit of kinds
not seen before — including but not restricted to Bitcoin. This may relieve
some of the tension between Labour and Capital which (by our analysis) has so
destabilised the world for the past ten years.27
It is worth pausing to compare and contrast the profile of blockchain tech with
that of machine learning / AI tech, which at first glance appears similar in that it
is also very mathematical and computer-intensive. It too requires highly qualified
labour, though perhaps not as much of it. However: the underlying technology
does not need to be democratised in quite the same way; its incentive is to resist
rather than promote the creation of legal frameworks (which increase costs);
and its raw input capital is Data (often from surveillance capitalism) which
is harvested, not built. In short: there is a possible incarnation of blockchain
tech, if it is ever created, which will want a community of active and informed
citizens using and innovating with its products to create economic output while
protected by well-considered legislative frameworks — whereas machine learning
seems to want to harvest data from a herd of humanity which uses its products
via controlled portals in de facto walled gardens, while operating in a legal void
except for those laws required to protect the incumbents’ datasets and IP.28
So, it may be that working towards even a fantasy of a blockchain-based
solution to the stagnation since 2008, may in itself usefully help to escape it —
regardless of whether it actually works for the purposes originally intended. At
a human and social level, that would be good enough.
A remarkable confluence of technologies is necessary for blockchain to work,
including: cryptography, computer science, mathematics, law, communications
infrastructure, and public education. To be useful this combination must diffuse
and democratise, and it is impossible to predict the effects this will have — not
just on society, but on the technology as well. As blockchain spreads, it will
evolve.
To democratise and diffuse, this technology will require a broad coalition:
from a pair of professors writing in Scotland to an Ethiopian coffee farmer; all
parties will be trying to solve their own individual problems, and if the tech is
to be truly useful it will need to assume different yet compatible forms, working
within sensible social and legal structures yet to be devised. This democratisation
and diffusion is likely to change the tech beyond recognition, and what started
as a techno-utopian dream may transition to be the backend of a bank, and then
go elsewhere and assume forms that we would hardly recognise.
One thing that seems likely — and of which we hope that Marx would approve
— is that if we can make this happen, then it will require a lot of work, and a
27 Thanks to the reader who astutely pointed out that Marx might say here that this
can only be temporary. No doubt, but a breathing space is still space to breath, and
all other things being equal, a technology that promises to create both labour and
capital is better than one that does not.
28 This is not to say that machine learning and AI are bad — just that it is not the
case that all tech is the same, just because it’s tech. Each technology has its own
character, and the gist of this article is an analysis of the specifics of Blockchain tech
through a lens of Marx’s theories.
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lot of infrastructure. That would be Labour and Capital working together again
— and that, in and of itself, would be cause for hope.
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